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Abstract  
According to the life cycle model of technological evolution, after the emergence of a dominant 
design, technological product industries undergo an “era of incremental change.” This era of 
incremental change is not well understood in the existing literature. Although the period is 
typically characterized in terms of stability and minimal innovation, we find that the era of 
incremental change can be actually quite dynamic. Through our research into the period of time 
following the emergence of a dominant design in automotive emission control systems, we find 
that the overall product innovation in the industry did not decline immediately following the 
dominant design, and increased throughout the era of incremental change. Further, we find that 
firms maintain their attention on the same core components that they innovated upon before the 
dominant design, but that these components make up less of the overall proportion of total 
innovation throughout the era of incremental change. Finally, we found that the concentration of 
innovating firms in the industry increases immediately following the dominant design, and this 
concentration decreases over time throughout the era of incremental change. Findings imply a 
pattern of contraction and expansion in the era of incremental change that extends previous work 
on the technological product life cycles and helps to characterize the era of incremental change 
in a novel way.  
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1. Introduction 
The early stages of new technological products are marked by periods of intense 
innovation and competition among contending product concepts until one emerges as the 
“dominant design” in an industry (Anderson and Tushman, 1990). After a dominant design 
emerges, there is a period of relative stability that has been characterized as the “era of 
incremental change” (Anderson and Tushman, 1990). During this era of incremental change, the 
product architecture remains stable and firms transfer their attention from the overall product to 
innovation associated with manufacturing processes, cost reductions, component improvements, 
and customer segmentation (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978; Anderson and Tushman, 1990; 
Henderson and Clark, 1990; Funk 2003). The era of incremental change is marked by 
organizational, social, and political stabilization (Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1992) that stands in 
stark contrast to the innovative turmoil and intense standards battles that precede the dominant 
design (Suarez, 2004). Essentially, the level of technological innovation diminishes as firms 
focus on other areas of improvement (process, customer segmentation, etc.); the type of 
technological innovation shifts to lower (and presumably less impactful) component levels; and 
the concentration of firms doing the innovating increases and stabilizes (Anderson and Tushman, 
1990; Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1992; Murmann and Frenken, 2006). What happens after a 
dominant design emerges is often seen as theoretically “uninteresting” by researchers (Dokko et 
al., 2012, p.682) – at least until the next technological disruption.  
Recent research has found, however, that this neglected period in technological life 
cycles can be quite interesting – and is not as stable and incremental as was previously thought 
(Murmann and Frenken. 2006; Funk. 2009; Dokko et al., 2012). Take, for example, the case of 
the catalytic converter in automotive emission systems. In the 1970s there was an intense battle 
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between competing standards intended to reduce pollutants from cars and fit regulatory 
emissions standards. Two different physical designs (dual converter and three-way) and two 
types of catalysts (pelleted and monolithic) were vying for the standard until the market settled 
on the on monolithic three-way converter architecture that has been standard for more than thirty 
years (Mondt, 2000; Heck and Farrauto, 2002). Automotive emissions stabilized on a dominant 
design in 1981, and in the first twenty years after this dominant design emerged, patenting 
activity associated with emissions increased significantly, overall performance of emissions 
technologies improved by a factor of three, and the digital revolution was leveraged to enable 
unprecedented emissions control and tuning (King and Lyytinen, 2005; Lee et al., 2011; Lee and 
Berente, 2012). This level of innovation can hardly be ignored by researchers of technology 
innovation, and causes us to question whether the technological innovativeness of the era of 
incremental change is, in fact, necessarily less than the time preceding the emergence of the 
dominant design (as posited by Anderson and Tushman, 1990). Also, with the focus on other 
innovations and improvements, does the low level of technological innovation (associated with 
products after a dominant design) necessarily remain stable throughout the era of incremental 
change? Further, given that organizational, social, and political dynamics may not stabilize in the 
same way that they are often characterized in the era of incremental change (Dokko et al., 2012), 
might the concentration of firms innovating in an industry be in greater flux than previously 
thought?  
 To address these questions and thus contribute to the literature on evolutionary lifecycles 
of technologies, we studied the period of time associated with the emergence of a dominant 
design in automotive emission control systems. We analyze patent data for the period from 1970 
to 1994 and compare pre and post dominant design patterns of activity. These comparisons 
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include: (1) the overall level of technological innovation; (2) the relative proportion of different 
types of component innovations; and (3) the overall concentration of firms innovating in the 
industry. We find that, contrary to some of the previous literature, that the overall rate of product 
innovation does not decrease immediately following the dominant design – and it appears to 
increase throughout the era of incremental change rather than stabilize or diminish. Also, firms 
do not immediately shift their innovative attentions away from “core” components where they 
focused before the dominant design. However, the overall proportion of innovation comprised by 
these core components does decrease over the era of incremental change. Finally, consistent with 
much of the literature, we find that the concentration of innovating firms increases immediately 
following the emergence of a dominant design, but decreases over the era of incremental change.  
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First we briefly review the literature 
on the product life cycle model of technological innovation, followed by the development of our 
hypotheses about the nature of innovation in the era of incremental change. We then present our 
research into automotive emissions control systems, and conclude with a discussion of our 
findings. 
 
2. Dominant Designs and the Era of Incremental Change 
The product life cycle model of technological innovation (e.g.  Anderson and Tushman, 
1990; Utterback and Suarez, 1993) is the leading framework for research into the dynamics of 
product evolution over time (Murmann and Frenken, 2006). According to this view, in the 
evolution of technological products, there is an intense period of “ferment” whereby firms 
compete for dominance with their versions of new product concepts, which culminates in the 
emergence of a dominant design. A dominant design is a stabilized “operational principle,” or 
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product architecture, that gains a majority of the market (Murmann and Franken, 2006). Once a 
dominant design emerges, there is a calm period of relative stability and incremental innovation 
until the next disruption. The calm period, which is referred to as the “era of incremental change” 
(Anderson and Tushman, 1990) has traditionally received relatively little scholarly attention.  
The era of incremental change is marked by a shift from product to process innovation 
(Abernathy and Utterback, 1978), accompanied by a general reduction of innovativeness and a 
focus on cost reduction and minor component and subsystem innovation (Anderson and 
Tushman, 1990). These efforts can be combined with product customization for differentiated 
market segments and other forms of detailed, “lower level” problem solving (Funk 2003). 
Organizational, social, and political forces stabilize around a particular product architecture 
(Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1992), and firms narrow their attention to more intensely address the 
component technologies associated with dominant design (as opposed to innovating on the 
architecture, see Henderson and Clark, 1990). Because the era of incremental change is generally 
thought to deal with minor changes and fairly stable phenomena, the bulk of research into the 
technology life cycles has historically focused on technological (architectural) discontinuities 
and the battles for dominant design (Suarez, 2003), and often ignores the era of incremental 
change.  
Recent work, however, has found that the era of incremental innovation is not quite so 
stable and uninteresting as it was (perhaps) previously thought. Incremental component 
innovations are often the source of the discontinuities in product architectures that result in 
disruptive innovations (Funk, 2009). Social and political elements of industries continue to be in 
a state of flux throughout the era of incremental innovation (Dokko et al., 2012). Many industries 
– particularly digitally intensive industries - do not exhibit the stability (associated with inverted 
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“U” shaped innovation cycles) that life cycle theory implies (Murmann and Frenken, 2006). 
Further, firms with products associated with a dominant design do not necessarily reduce the 
scope of their technology innovation efforts – many maintain capabilities and continue to 
innovate across product levels and relevant components (Brusoni et al., 2001).  
Although the era of incremental change may not be so stable and “uninteresting” (Dokko 
et al., 2012), there are some points upon which the literature broadly agrees. For example, when 
a dominant design emerges for a given product, uncertainty is reduced with respect to product 
architectures (the operational concepts and linkages between components) and firms do shift 
their attention from architectures to different innovations associated with the product (Murman 
and Frenken, 2006). Some of this attention will focus on product innovation at a component1 
level (Henderson and Clark, 1990), but innovative activities following the dominant design will 
also focus elsewhere - such as on manufacturing processes. This means that the overall product 
innovation in this period of time will be significantly less than in the era before the dominant 
design, and the rate of such innovations will likewise diminish or remain minimal as this 
attention is spread across these different objectives (Anderson and Tushman, 1990). Further, 
market dynamics among firms will stabilize and solidify around shared routines, which would 
limit the number of new entrants (Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1992; Murmann and Frenken, 2006).  
Thus we have three dimensions along which we can expect a difference between the era 
of ferment and the era of incremental change: the level of product innovation, the type of product 
(component) innovations, and the industry composition (i.e. concentration of firms). Next we 
will briefly attend to each dimension, followed by hypotheses derived from the extant literature. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For simplicity, in this paper we use the term “component” as a generic term for any of the nested subsystems 
within a technological product hierarchy (Murmann and Frenken 2006). 
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2.1. Level of Product Innovation 
According to the traditional view, “most of the total performance improvement over the 
lifetime of a technology will occur outside the era of incremental improvement” (Anderson and 
Tushman, 1990, p.618). After the dominant design emerges, there is a “period of inertia” 
characterized by network externalities, lock in, and standard interpretive frames that limit 
product innovations to the types that are consistent with the needs of existing customers (Kaplan 
and Tripsas, 2008). Once the era of incremental change commences, the amount of product 
innovation is thought to diminish in favor of other forms of innovation (i.e., processes, etc., 
Abernathy and Utterback, 1978; Anderson and Tushman, 1990; Henderson and Clark, 1990; 
Funk, 2003). Other forms of innovation – such as process improvement – can be leveraged 
across multiple products and afford greater return for firms in this period of stable product 
architectures (Klepper and Simon, 1997). Therefore, in the period of time following the 
stabilization of a product’s architecture (i.e., the emergence of the dominant design) we would 
expect to see a lower level of overall product innovation compared to the time preceding that 
stabilization. From this received view, we expect the following: 
Hypothesis 1a: In a technological product industry, the overall level of product 
innovation immediately following the emergence of a dominant design will be lower 
than the level of product innovation before the emergence of a dominant design. 
 
However, as indicated above, recent work has found that the level of innovativeness in 
the era of incremental change can be quite dramatic (Funk 2009; Lee and Berente, 2012). This 
recent work resonates with some of the case studies that found innovations in the era of 
incremental change to have a strong impact on product performance (Iansiti and Khanna, 1995; 
Christensen et al., 1998). Particularly in digitally-intensive industries (Murmann and Frenken, 
2006), where the architectures are layered, open-ended, and generative (Yoo et al., 2010) we 
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would expect the initially reduced level of product innovation in an industry to increase over 
time following the emergence of a dominant design. As large system integrating firms build 
capabilities on components, their suppliers attempt to move up the value chain and gain 
experience with architectures, and lower level components become more interesting (Brusoni et 
al., 2001; Funk 2009; Lee and Berente, 2012), innovative activity on technologies should 
accelerate over time during the era of incremental change. Thus we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 1b: In a technological product industry, the overall level of product 
innovation increases over time during the era of incremental change. 
 
As far as the composition of this innovation, there is widespread agreement that after a 
dominant design emerges, firms will shift their attention from the overall architecture to 
component innovation (Henderson and Clark, 1990). However, there is little research into the 
shape of this component innovation and which components will be innovated upon relative to 
each other and over time. Next we will address the types of component innovation in the era of 
incremental change. 
 
2.2. Types of Component Innovation 
Technological products are typically conceived to be hierarchical systems, which are 
collections of nested, interdependent subsystems (components) coupled together by linking 
mechanisms (Clark, 1985; Constant, 1987; Hughes, 1987; Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1992; 
Murmann and Tushman, 2006). Firms cannot attend equally to each component, so their 
attention shifts across the product hierarchy over time as they collectively go about “working 
through” different components and solving key problems (Clark, 1985; pg. 243). Some of these 
components are more functionally significant than others, and these significant components can 
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be expected to gain much of the early attention for technological development (Clark, 1985). 
Tushman and Rosenkopf (1992) describe more functionally significant components as “core” to 
a technology, and other, less significant components as “peripheral.” Core components are 
central to the operational principle of the product and peripheral components support the 
functions of the core components (Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1992). Murmann and Frenken (2006) 
use the biological concept of “pleiotropy” to distinguish between core and peripheral 
components of a technological product. Core components affect many functions of the product 
(i.e., high pleiotropy - such as genotypes in biology), whereas peripheral components support the 
core components, and have relatively fewer functions (i.e. low pleiotropy – phenotypes in 
biology). Core components are the tightly coupled portion that represents “a strategic 
performance bottleneck,” and peripheral components are those that are only weakly linked to 
other components (Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1992). A technological product may consist of 
multiple core components, and it is important to note that core components of any technological 
product may shift over time (Tushman and Murmann, 2002). Components that were peripheral 
before the emergence of a dominant design may become increasingly important after product 
architecture has stabilized. Particularly in areas that involve digital technologies (Lee and 
Berente, 2012), components that previously served mainly to support other components, may 
evolve into a significant role in product performance. We refer to such components as 
“subsequent core components.”  A subsequent core component is a formerly peripheral 
component that takes a more central role in the performance of a product after the emergence of 
a dominant design. We contrast a subsequent core component with a “preceding core 
components” – the core components that were central to the product architecture before the 
dominant design. 
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In general, if one thinks of products as hierarchical systems, firms would generally shift 
their attention from the architecture overall to focus on the innovation of components of the 
product (Henderson and Clark, 1990). Core components are central elements of product 
architectures, and are therefore important to the competition between architectural platforms 
(Utterback and Suarez, 1993), but are only one of many points of competition once the 
architecture has stabilized. So we would expect the level of innovative activity to be high for 
such components before the emergence of the dominant design. After the dominant design 
emerges, however, firms shift their attention from architecture to more diverse components in 
associated with the product (Henderson and Clark, 1990; Anderson and Tushman, 1990). Thus 
we would expect that subsequent core components (those that were formerly peripheral) would 
take a proportionally greater share of the organizational attention to product innovation in the 
years following the emergence of a dominant design, as firms shift their attention from preceding 
core components. Accordingly, we would expect the following: 
Hypothesis 2a: In a technological product industry, ‘preceding’ core components will 
account for less of an overall proportion (or share) of component innovations 
immediately following the emergence of a dominant design.  
  
Further, Tushman and Murmann claim that “once a particular core subsystem 
[component] closes on a dominant design, the product’s strategic action moves to another core 
subsystem [component] or another key dimension of merit” (2002; pg. 332). As the bottlenecks 
from one component are reduced, firms shift their attention to the next bottleneck, which 
becomes the focus of their innovative activity (Clark 1985; Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1992). The 
core componente important to the formation of the dominant design will then stabilize, and the 
attention will shift to (what were, perhaps, formerly) peripheral components. These peripheral 
components will benefit from self-reinforcing feedback associated with the building of 
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capabilities within each of the components and across ever-new components and their linkages 
(Iansiti, 1998; Brusoni et al., 2001). Overall this will result in increasing levels of innovation 
over time on those peripheral components as these capabilities strengthen. Thus we expect: 
Hypothesis 2b: In a technological product industry, ‘preceding’ core components will 
account for a decreasing proportion (or share) of component innovations over time 
during the era of incremental change. 
  
After a product architecture stabilizes (i.e., a dominant design emerges) firms shift their 
attention to other elements of a product hierarchy (Clark, 1985; Henderson and Clark, 1990). 
Large system integrators in the industry focus their attention widely across the product 
architecture – innovating on all sorts of components (Brusoni et al., 2001) including both 
preceding and subsequent core components (as well as peripheral components that remain 
peripheral). However, this shift in firms’ attention is not necessarily uniform. Certain 
components – those that are increasingly important – can be expected to receive more attention. 
What we refer to as “subsequent core components” (components that were previously peripheral 
but have become more central to the architecture over time, see Tushman and Murmann, 2002) 
would potentially be more important than other peripheral components, and firms in the industry 
would look to build capabilities in such components to remain competitive. Further, although 
new entrants must overcome significant R&D barriers associated with ‘preceding’ core 
components which are established by the incumbents’ accumulated patents and product 
knowledge (Mueller and Tilton, 1969; Suarez and Utterback, 1995; Kaplan and Tripsas, 2008), 
these barriers will not be as entrenched for subsequent core components. New entrants would not 
be quite as disadvantaged in forming competencies around emerging core components that were 
not previously central to the architecture – the routines and patterns of activity are not yet 
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strongly established (Kaplan and Tripsas, 2008) among subsequent core components (as 
compared to ‘preceding’ core components).  Therefore, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2c: In a technological product industry, ‘subsequent’ core components will 
account for an increasing proportion (or share) of component innovations over time 
during the era of incremental change. 
 
This hypothesis relies, to a large extent on the nature of competition in and industry and 
barriers to entry associated with the emergence of a dominant design (Kaplan and Tripsas, 2008). 
Next we address certain related industry dynamics with respect to the concentration of firms in 
an industry. 
 
2.3. Concentration of Firms 
As indicated above, the era of incremental change is traditionally thought to involve a 
greater concentration of firms in an industry (Murmann and Frenken, 2006). This period of time 
is marked by organizational, social and political stability where routines and patterns of activity 
become entrenched and reinforced (Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1992), thus offering an advantage 
to incumbent firms (Kaplan and Tripsas, 2008). Firms associated with the dominant design “win” 
the battles and thus reap the rewards (Suarez, 2004) and the unsuccessful firms attempt to adapt 
to the new situation. These unsuccessful firms have knowledge invested in the architectures that 
may now be obsolete and it is no small effort to adapt and gain the new knowledge necessary to 
compete (Christensen et al., 1998). Therefore less agile firms end up falling out the industry, 
resulting in a general increase in the concentration of firms that remain. Fewer firms will be 
innovating in the era of incremental change - at least in the early years of the era of incremental 
change. From this we propose: 
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Hypothesis 3a: In a technological product industry, the concentration of firms 
innovating immediately following the emergence of a dominant design will be higher 
than the concentration of firms innovating before the emergence of a dominant design. 
 
However, it is important to note that stable product architectures are accompanied by 
reductions in uncertainty and well-defined linkages that invite the entry of new firms, which can 
also involve component-level innovation (Baldwin and Clark, 2000). This implies that stable 
designs might actually encourage the number of firms participating in component innovation in a 
given industry. In addition, with the increasing importance of subsequent core component 
innovations, the diverse capabilities required by a new technological regime would provide 
opportunity for potential entrants to invest in R&D to exploit the new market for technology 
(Arora et al., 2001; Greaker, 2006; Greaker and Rosendahl, 2008). Similarly, as larger firms that 
integrate technological products may increase their component innovation in the wake of a 
dominant design (Henderson and Clark, 1990), they may do so with components that are not 
necessarily in their core product offering - since large integrators need to maintain capabilities in 
a variety of interdependent components of technological products (Brusoni et al., 2001; Lee and 
Berente, 2012). Also, given the gaining importance of subsequent core components, the 
component innovations from new industry entrants can have a tremendous impact on product 
performance (Funk, 2009), and the innovative activities of these new entrants cannot be ignored. 
From this analysis we produce the following hypothesis about the concentration of firms in an 
industry over the era of incremental change: 
Hypothesis 3b: In a technological product industry, the concentration of innovating 
firms decreases over time during the era of incremental change. 
  
From our review of the literature on the era of incremental change for technological 
products, we developed seven hypotheses about the level of product innovations, type of 
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component innovations, and the concentration of innovating firms in a technological product 
industry following the establishment of a dominant design. We test these hypotheses using data 
from the automotive emissions industry. Next we will briefly address this research context, 
followed by a presentation of our research. 
 
3. Innovation in automobile emission control systems 
The evolution of automotive emission control systems (AECS) technology provides an 
appropriate context for examining the era of incremental change that arises after the emergence 
of a dominant design. In this case, the dominant design involves the standardization on a three-
way catalyst-based catalytic converter architecture in 1981, which was followed by more than a 
decade of architectural stability until the technological shift resulting from on-board electronic 
diagnostic control modules in 1994 (e.g. Mondt, 2000; NESCAUM, 2000). Figure 1 depicts a 
simplified representation of the historical development of the AECS technologies from 1970 to 
1994.  There are two distinct periods: the pre-dominant design “era of ferment” and the post-
dominant design “era of incremental change.” The period from 1981 to 1994 represents the era 
of incremental change. 
 
FIGURE 1 
Time frame of Analysis in Development of the AECS Technologies: 1970-1994	  
 
1970 1981 1994
Era	  of	  Incremental	  ChangeEra	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(3-­‐way	  Catalyst)
Subsequent	  Technological	  Shift
(Onboard	  Electronics)CAAA	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3.1. Emergence of the dominant design in AECS technology  
In the 1970s, the focus of innovation in the automobile emission control system was on 
the catalyst technology. High automobile tailpipe emission reduction requirements mandated by 
the Clean Air Act Amendments in 1970 (1970 CAAA) led to the development of catalyst-based 
emissions reduction technology known as the catalytic converter. Initially, automakers attempted 
to satisfy emissions reduction requirements by modifying existing engine architecture with 
technologies such as exhaust gas recirculation (EGR), thermal vacuum switch (TVS), lean and 
rich thermal reactors, and air preheat systems (THERMAC) rather than by installing an add-in 
type catalytic converter which was costly and required extensive knowledge in catalysts that 
automakers did not possess. To automakers, a catalyst-based emission control system 
represented a competence-destroying technological discontinuity rather than a competence-
enhancing technological discontinuity (Tushman and Anderson, 1986) because emissions 
reduction by catalyst technology would make most of their existing engine modification 
technologies obsolete. Honda’s compound vortex controlled combustion (CVCC) engines and 
Chrysler’s lean-burn engines, which satisfied the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) 
1975 intermediary regulatory stringencies for hydrocarbon (HC) and carbon monoxide (CO) 
reduction levels (Dexter, 1979; Doyle, 2000) exemplify automakers’ inclination to rely on their 
existing expertise when faced with technological threats (Anderson and Tushman, 1990; Cooper 
and Schendel, 1976). However, Honda’s CVCC and Chrysler’s lean-burn engines failed to 
satisfy nitrogen oxide (NOx) reduction requirements originally stipulated under the 1970 CAAA. 
Add-in type catalytic converters eventually became the only viable technical solutions for 
reducing all three pollutants: HC, CO, and NOx simultaneously.  
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Two different catalyst systems--pelleted and monolithic type catalysts--competed to gain 
wider acceptance among automakers (Mondt, 2000; Heck and Farrauto, 2002). Another 
competition for dominance during this period came between the dual converter and the three-
way catalyst (TWC) system converter design (Mondt, 2000; Heck and Farrauto, 2002). These 
two different converter designs emerged primarily to satisfy NOx reduction standards. Firms 
were under pressure to develop the automobile emission control technology with improved NOx 
control capability that permits less than 1 gm of NOx per mile. Reducing NOx requires lean O2 
concentration, while oxidation of CO and HC needs a higher concentration of O2, which was a 
technical complication that proved to be a major hurdle in the development of such catalysts. The 
TWC system design eventually won favor because it was capable of reducing all three major 
pollutants (HC, CO, and NOx) simultaneously. Engineers found a narrow range in the air-to-fuel 
ratio in which reduction of NOx and oxidation of CO and HC are simultaneously possible using 
fuel injection and sensor technologies. Eventually, the TWC converter technology using 
monolithic type catalysts became the dominant design for automobile emission control systems 
in 1981, satisfying the 90% reduction requirement originally mandated in the Amendments of the 
Clean Air Act of 1970.  
 
3.1.2. Digital controls as a ‘subsequent’ core component  
The focus of innovation shifted, in part, to digital controls after the emergence of the 
catalyst-based dominant design. Indeed, firms continued to make incremental innovations in 
catalyst technology such as developing more durable catalysts that can withstand more severe 
driving conditions. Yet, the focus of innovation on digital controls grew significantly as firms 
recognized that the EPA would introduce another set of amendments to the Clean Air Act that 
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required even more stringent automobile emission reductions than those of the 1970 CAAA (Lee 
et al.,2011). Firms eventually standardized on an advanced electronic on-board automotive 
diagnostic module (OBD) in 1994, and used OBD technology to satisfy new regulatory standard 
mandated under the Amendments to the Clean Air Act in 1990 (1990 CAAA). The introduction 
of the automotive OBD represents the emergence of a post-dominant design subsystem-level 
technological shift (Lee & Berente 2012). An electronic onboard diagnostic system monitors all 
parts of the AECS including the main catalysts, thermal system, and fuel injection system 
through emission system sensors, and provides input signals to different part of the AECS to 
ensure optimal operations (Mondt, 2000).    
Figure 2 illustrates the progress in performance in AECS technology from 1970 to 1994, 
as defined in terms of percentage improvements in pollutant (HC, CO, and NOx) reductions in 
grams per mile from the prior technology. The emergence of three technologies is shown in 
figure 2: oxidation catalysts, three-way catalysts, and advanced electronic control modules. Each 
represents technological discontinuity in 1975, dominant design in 1981, and the post-dominant 
design technological shift in 1994, respectively. Each introduction was accompanied by 
significant performance improvements. Prior to the emergence of the oxidation-catalyst-based 
catalytic converter, automakers relied on engine modification techniques to reduce auto 
emissions, and the introduction of catalyst-based auto emission control technology in 1975 
signified an emergence of a technological discontinuity, a new technological approach for 
controlling auto emissions. As is shown in figure 2, its introduction brought about significant 
performance improvement over the previous engine-modification-based auto emissions reduction 
technologies.  
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FIGURE 2 
Performance Progresses in Automobile Emission Control Technologies 
 
	  
 
4. Method 
4.1. Data  
 To study innovation in AECS, we identified relevant patent data for AECS technology 
using the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) public database. The patent database for 
AECS technology was built using both the class-based and abstract-based keyword search 
methods. We began with the class-based search approach, adopting patent subclasses identified 
by Campbell and Levine’s (1984) earlier study on catalytic converter technology. Moreover, we 
complemented the patent class search by pursuing an abstract-based search to ensure that we 
captured the entire set of emission control technologies for automobiles. Although a patent-class-
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based search allows for capturing a broad range of relevant inventions, outdated patent classes 
identified by an earlier study would not fully capture the breadth of AECS technologies that have 
evolved. The abstract-based search, which identifies relevant patents by using representative 
keywords, thus complements the class-based search. The abstract-based search helped us identify 
relevant patents not found by the class-based search.  For the abstract-based search we selected 
seven keywords that represent AECS technologies - catalytic converter, emission, automobile, 
catalyst, pollution, exhausts, and engine - and searched the USPTO patent database electronically 
by using various combinations of these keywords. We also closely examined the abstracts of all 
identified patents to further screen for catalytic converter technology that does not belong to 
automotive applications from the database. Patent data has some limitations as a measure of 
innovation, and patents certainly do not capture the entirety of innovation in an industry (Scherer 
1983, Griliches 1990, Acs et al. 2002; Kerr and Shihe, 2008). However, patent as a data is highly 
correlated to the extent of the firm’s innovation activities (Trajtenberg 1989), and the automotive 
industry relies heavily on patenting. Further, patent data, with all its limitations, does allow for a 
detailed longitudinal analysis of the process of technical change in a way that few other datasets 
can (Almeida et al. 2002; Katila, 2002). 
 The total number of successfully applied patents relevant to AECS technologies assigned 
to firms from 1970 to 1994 is 1,429.2  We further categorized the carefully screened and 
identified AECS patents into three sub-technology categories - catalysts, digital controls, and 
manufacturing - to specifically examine the era of incremental change. The AECS technologies 
that belong to catalyst categories include catalyst support materials, palladium three-way 
catalysts, and porous catalyst carriers. Those that belong to the digital controls category included 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Detailed information regarding identified patents and corresponding patent classes is available from the 
authors upon request. 
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air to fuel ratio control, EGR control, and various types of sensors. Manufacturing AECS 
technologies include the assembly method for catalytic converter and catalytic converter housing 
design.   
 The first author possesses deep technical knowledge of the auto emissions control 
technology and used his knowledge for categorizing AECS patents into the three different 
categories.3 Nevertheless, his patent coding was cross-checked by an independent coder to 
establish independent justification of the coding scheme. We used the period from 1980 to 1994 
for this study since this time period captures the beginning of the development of the AECS 
technology in 1970 to the emergence of a post dominant design technological shift in digital 
controls: the on-board diagnostic module in 1994 (marking the end of that era of incremental 
change). 
4.2. Dependent variables 
 There are three different dependent variables for this study: (1) the level of product 
innovation (H1a and H1b), (2) the proportion of different types of component innovations (H2a, 
H2b and H2c) and (3) the concentration of innovating firms (H3a and H3b). We measured the 
level of product innovation using the number of successful annual patent applications in two key 
component [subsystem] technologies (catalyst and digital controls). These two component 
technologies are the ones that became the core components over the evolution of the auto 
emissions control technology-- catalyst technology was the core subsystem technology 
responsible for the emergence of the dominant design in 1981 (catalytic converter technology, 
i.e., the ‘preceding’ core component) and digital controls technology was the subsequent core 
component technology responsible for the emergence of the onboard diagnostic system in 1994.  
Patenting trend data in the two key component technologies is plotted in figure 3.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The first author has extensive industry experience as an automotive technical engineer in a major automaker. 
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FIGURE 3 
Patenting Trend in Two Key Subsystem Technologies 
	  
  
The proportion of subsystem technology in a given year was measured by dividing the number of 
subsystem technology patents by the overall patent counts in the AECS technology in that 
particular year. Specifically, we measured the proportion for catalyst and digital controls 
subsystem technologies.  
To construct the concentration of innovating firms measure, we used the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) (Hall, 2005) as below: 
HHI of innovating firms = Si2
i=1
n
∑   
where Si represents the patent share of firm i in the auto emissions control technology field, and 
N is the number of patenting firms.  
 
 
0	  10	  
20	  30	  
40	  50	  
60	  70	  
80	  90	  
100	  
1970	   1972	   1974	   1976	   1978	   1980	   1982	   1984	   1986	   1988	   1990	   1992	   1994	  
N
um
be
r	  
of
	  S
uc
ce
ss
fu
l	  a
nn
ua
l	  p
at
en
t	  
ap
pl
ic
at
io
ns
	  
Year	  
Electronics	  Catalysts	  
	   22	  
4.3.  Independent and control variables 
 We used two variables to estimate the dynamic effects of the dominant design. First, we 
created a dominant design dummy variable to capture the effect of the establishment of a 
dominant design in 1981. We coded one for period between 1981 to1994, and refer to this 
variable as the era of incremental change.  Second, we created a time trend variable to capture 
the dynamic effects of the dominant design during the post dominant design period, that is, 
whether the dominant design effect increase or decrease over time. This time trend variable is 
equal to zero from 1970 to 1980 and counts the number of years starting from 1981 when the 
dominant design was established. Therefore, time trend variable indicates whether the size of the 
main effect increases or decreases over time during the era of incremental change.  
We added a number of control variables: expenditure, auto sales, patenting in auto 
electronics and patenting in total auto technologies, to account for potential factors that may also 
affect innovation in AECS. First, we included in the equation capital expenditures for emission 
control for light-duty vehicles (expenditure) to control for the potential impact of industry capital 
expenditures on innovation in the development of the automobile emission control devices. 
Because government regulations such as the Clean Air Acts of 1970 and 1990 were among of the 
major factors influencing the firms’ R&D decisions (including the industry capital expenditure in 
complying with the regulation particularly), expenditures effectively control for the potential 
impact of the regulations on innovative activity. Industry capital expenditures on automobile 
emission control devices are estimated using the data provided by the Environmental Protection 
Agency and the California Air Resource Board (EPA, 1990; CARB, 1996). Both the EPA (1990) 
and CARB (1996) reports provide cost estimates with a detailed breakdown of components of 
the emission control systems such as evaporative emissions canisters, exhaust gas recirculation 
	   23	  
units, universal exhaust oxygen sensors, full electronic EGR system, close-coupled catalysts, 
electrically heated catalysts, leak-free exhaust systems, engine modifications such as improved 
piston ring and head gasket design, and electric air injection system. The EPA’s (1990) study 
reveals that by 1994, auto emission devices approximately cost an additional $475 per vehicle to 
achieve 90% of tailpipe emission reductions from the pre 1970 emission level. Further study 
using the data from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics shows that the cost of the emission control 
system further increased due to the phase-in of the Tier I standards in 1994 (Anderson and 
Sherwood, 2002). 
We also controlled for potential market forces in the development of the AECS 
technology by including a variable that captures US retail car sales (Auto Sales). We used Ward’s 
automotive publication to obtain US retail car sales data (Ward’s Auto, 2010). Firm innovation in 
the development of the AECS technology can be affected by an overall innovation trend in the 
automobile industry – and in this case there was widespread component innovation in digital 
technologies and electronics in the 1980s and 1990s due to the digital revolution. Thus, we also 
included the total patent counts in automotive electronics technology as a control (Auto Patents) 
to capture any potential effect that patenting in electronics auto emission control technology 
reflects overall patenting activities in automotive electronics technologies and thus do more to 
isolate the impact of the technology lifecyle. We used the United States Patent Classification 
(USPC) to obtain annual patent counts in automotive digital controls technologies. Patent classes 
used to search automotive digital controls technologies include 307/101.1 (automotive 
transmission or interconnection systems) and 315/77 (electric discharge devices for vehicles)4.  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Full patent classes used to search patents in auto electronics technologies are available from authors upon request  
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4.4.  Statistical method 
Because the dependent variable for H1a and H1b (Product innovation) consisted of 
patents of two key component technologies, we used a negative binomial specification. The 
negative binomial panel regression is well known to account for the count nature of patent data 
and repeated cross-sectional observation a period of time would be appropriate (Hausman et al., 
1984). As the data for this study consisted of a panel of observations for firm patenting activities 
over multiple years (1970-1994), a negative binomial specification is deemed appropriate. For 
regressions that involve non-count fractional dependent variables (Proportion of innovation and 
Firm concentration), we used the generalized linear model (glm) regression technique. The 
generalized linear model is known to account for the properties of non-normally distributed 
variables such as proportion based on counts whose values fall between zero and one 
(McCullagh and Nelder, 1989).  We also report results with robust standard errors using the 
Huber-White estimator for variance. 
To further build robustness into our analysis and complement pooled regressions, we ran 
additional firm fixed-effects panel regressions for H1 (Product innovation) and H2 (Proportion 
of component innovation). The advantage of using fixed-effects regression is that it controls for 
unobservable firm-level heterogeneities that are not accounted for in the regression model such 
as firms’ propensity for patenting their ideas (Pavitt, 1985) and firms’ capabilities such as 
technological investments and strategies (Penner-Hahn and Shaver, 2004; Arundel and Kabla, 
1998). For the fixed-effect panel regressions, we used the patent data of the top fifteen patenting 
firms: five automakers (General Motors, Toyota, Ford, Nissan, and Honda) and ten component 
suppliers (Engelhard, W.R. Grace, Corning, Nippondenso, EMITEC GmBH, NGK insulators, 
Robert Bosch, Universal Oil Production Company, Hitachi, and SIEMENS). 
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5. Results 
 Tables 1 and 2 show descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix for variables used to 
test the hypotheses. Table 2 shows that some variables are highly correlated. High correlations 
among variables are known to cause significant muliticollinearity; thus, bias regression estimates 
(Kennedy, 1985). To ensure that our regressions do not suffer from potential multicollinearity 
problems, we calculated the variable inflation factor (VIF) for all regression model 
specifications. None of the calculated VIFs was found to be higher than 10, which indicates that 
regression models in this study do not suffer from harmful collinearity (Kennedy, 1985). 
TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics of Variables Used for Analyses 
Variables   Description Mean S.D. Max. Min. 
Product Innovation Successfully applied annual patent counts in two 
key subsystem AECS technologies (Catalyst and 
Digital controls) 
38.84 30.47 121.00 11.00 
 
Proportion Catalyst Proportion of innovation in catalyst AECS 
subsystem technology 
0.42 0.14 0.77 0.14 
Proportion 
Electronics 
Proportion of innovation in electronics AECS 
subsystem technology 
0.24 0.14 0.57 0.07 
Dominant design Period dummy variable coded as 1 since the 
emergence of dominant design in 1981 and 0 
otherwise 
0.56 0.51 1.00 0.00 
Time trend Time trend after the emergence of dominant design 
in 1981  
4.20 4.89 14.00 0.00 
Catalyst Innovation (patenting) in catalyst AECS technology 
from 1970 to 1980, and zero otherwise 
20.40 9.70 41.00 7.00 
Digital controls Innovation (patenting) in digital controls AECS 
technology from 1981 to 1998, and zero otherwise 
18.44 24.60 91.00 1.00 
Expenditure Capital expenditures on automotive emission 
control devices per car                  (In 2000 US$) 
528.75 278.70 
 
843.34 14.50 
Auto sales Total annual auto sales in U.S. (×106) 7.25 1.27 9.66 5.05 
Patenting in auto 
electronics  
Successful total annual patent applications in 
automotive electronics technology 
99.68 51.55 223.00 39.00 
Total auto patents Successful total annual U.S. patent applications in 
automotive technologies  
904.52 271.16 1390.00 117.00 
Innovating Firm 
Concentration 
Innovating (patenting) firm concentration 0.08 0.02 0.14 0.04 
 
Table 3 and 4 reports results of tests for hypotheses. Table 3 reports regression results 
using the pooled dataset while table 4 reports regression results using the panel dataset.  We also 
report log likelihoods (table 3) and chi-squares (table 4) at the bottom of the table. 
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Table 2. 
Correlations Matrix 
                                                                                                                      n=1429 
 Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
         
1.  Time trend   
 
     
2.  Catalyst 0.34*   
 
    
3. 
 
4. 
 Digital controls 
 
 Expenditure 
 
0.67* 
 
0.73* 
0.48* 
 
-0.12 
 
 
0.26* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
5.      Auto sales 
 
-0.56* .010 -0.27* -0.54*    
6.     
 
Auto electronics patents 0.91* 0.45* 0.79* 0.49* -0.45*   
7 Total auto patents 0.80* 0.29* 0.40* 0.53* -0.35* 0.75*  
 
8 
 
Dominant design 
 
0.78* 
 
-0.06 
 
0.22* 
 
0.85* 
 
-0.62* 
 
0.53* 
 
 
0.64* 
Note. Correlation for non-interacting independent variables is not reported. 
     *p <0.05 
 
For both table 3 and table 4, model 1 and model 2 show the regression results using 
product innovation (i.e., the level of overall product innovation) as the dependent variable. 
Similarly, model 3 through model 6 display the regression results using proportion of component 
innovations (i.e., catalyst technologies as ‘preceding’ core component and electronics 
technologies as ‘subsequent’ core component) as the dependent variables. For table 3, model 7 
and model 8 show the results using innovating firm concentration as the dependent variable. In 
both tables (table 3 and table 4), dominant design and time trend are predictor variables; and auto 
sales, expenditures, total auto patents and auto electronics patents are control variables. In 
particular, auto electronics patents are specially added in model 6 to control for potential impact 
that patenting in overall automotive electronics may have on firm patenting behaviors in 
electronics automotive emissions control technologies.  
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Table	  3.	  
Pooled	  Regression	  Results	  	  
 
 
Dependent variables Product innovation Proportion of subsystem technology             Catalyst                     Digital Controls 
Innovating firm 
concentration 
Model 1 
1970-83 
YrDD +2 
Model 2 
1970-94 
 
Model 3 
1970-83 
YrDD +2 
Model 4 
1970-94 
 
Model 5 
1970-94 
 
Model 6 
1970-94 
 
Model 7 
1970-83 
YrDD +2 
Model 8 
1970-94 
 
 
Dominant design  
 
 
-0.68 
(0.97) 
 
-1.36**** 
(0.29) 
 
0.27**** 
(0.03) 
 
0.27*** 
(0.10) 
 
-0.19** 
(0.08) 
 
-0.29*** 
(0.10) 
 
0.02** 
(0.01) 
 
0.003 
(0.01) 
Time trend 0.39 
(0.63) 
0.23**** 
(0.02) 
-0.19**** 
(0.03) 
-0.03*** 
(0.01) 
0.04**** 
(0.01) 
0.05*** 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
Log (Auto sales (1/103)) 2.03** 
(0.83) 
0.60 
(0.65) 
-0.13 
(0.16) 
0.17 
(0.19) 
0.08 
(0.11) 
-0.03 
(0.12) 
-0.02 
(0.05) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
Log (Expenditure) -0.02 
(0.10) 
-0.06 
(0.14) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
0.005 
(0.02) 
0.03* 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
Auto electronics patents (1/103)       -1.42 
(1.23) 
  
Total auto patents (1/103) -0.27 
(0.57) 
-0.66** 
(0.31) 
0.05 
(0.08) 
0.03 
(0.12) 
-0.31** 
(0.10) 
 -0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
Intercept 
 
-0.45 
(1.91) 
3.02* 
(1.75) 
0.72** 
(0.33) 
0.12 
(0.41) 
0.25 
(0.26) 
0.21 
(0.26) 
0.10 
(0.14) 
0.11 
(0.07) 
N 624 1429 624 1429 1429 1429 624 
 
1429 
Log Likelihood -48.72 -95.53 15.18 19.28 25.74 23.84 32.50 65.98 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  *p-­‐value	  <0.1;	  **p-­‐value	  <0.05;	  ***p-­‐value	  <0.01,	  ****p-­‐value	  <0.001,	  two-­‐tailed	  tests.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  YrDD	  (the	  year	  the	  dominant	  design	  in	  AECS	  technology	  emerged)=	  1981	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Table	  4.	  
Panel	  Regression	  Results	  	  
 
 
Dependent variables Product innovation 
Proportion of subsystem technology 
   Catalyst                                    Digital controls 
 Model 1 
1970-83 
YrDD +2 
Model 2 
1970-94 
 
Model 3 
1970-83 
YrDD +2 
Model 4 
1970-94 
 
Model 5 
1970-94 
 
Model 6 
1970-94 
 
 
Dominant design  
 
 
0.20 
(0.94) 
 
-1.38**** 
(0.29) 
 
0.05 
(0.03) 
 
0.03 
(0.02) 
 
-0.02* 
(0.01) 
 
-0.03** 
(0.10) 
Time trend -0.18 
(0.64) 
0.26**** 
(0.04) 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
0.005*** 
(0.002) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
Log (Auto sales (1/103)) 1.70** 
(0.76) 
0.71 
(0.62) 
-0.02 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.003 
(0.01) 
Log (Expenditure) 0.09 
(0.08) 
0.03 
(0.08) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
0.0005 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
Auto electronics patents (1/103)      -0.13* 
(0.08) 
Total auto patents (1/103) 2.85* 
(1.61) 
-1.01 
(0.74) 
0.06 
(0.06) 
0.003 
(0.05) 
-0.04* 
(0.02) 
 
Intercept 
 
-5.24*** 
(1.76) 
-0.67 
(1.13) 
0.004 
(0.05) 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
N 201 375 210 375 375 
 
375 
Wald Chi2 20.83*** 141.23*** 8.23 11.70** 10.74* 10.98* 	   	   *p-­‐value	  <0.1;	  **p-­‐value	  <0.05;	  ***p-­‐value	  <0.01,	  ****p-­‐value	  <0.001,	  two-­‐tailed	  tests.	  	  	   	   YrDD	  (the	  year	  the	  dominant	  design	  in	  AECS	  technology	  emerged)=	  1981	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 In hypothesis1a, we argued that the overall level of product innovation in an industry is 
lower immediately after the emergence of a dominant design for a technological product. To test 
hypothesis 1a, we examined the coefficient for the dominant design dummy in model 1, table 3 
and 4.  To operationalize patenting activities immediately after the emergence of the dominant 
design, we examined the coefficient of the dominant design dummy for the first two years after 
the emergence of a dominant design (model 1).1	  	  The	  coefficient	   is	  negative	  and	   insignificant	  for	  the	  regression	  using	  the	  pooled	  dataset.	  Similarly,	  fixed-­‐effects	  regression	  results	  using	  the	  panel	  dataset	  (model	  1,	  table	  4)	  also	  show	  that,	  the	  dominant	  design	  dummy	  coefficient	  for	   the	   first	   two	   years	   is	   insignificant.	   Consequently,	   these	   findings	   together	   disconfirm	  hypothesis	  1a.	  	  
In hypothesis 1b, we hypothesized that for a technological product, the overall level of 
product innovation in an industry increases over time during the era of incremental change. To 
test hypothesis 1b, we examined the time trend variable in model 2, table 3 and 4.  The time trend 
variable is positive and significant (p <0.001) for model 2 in both the pooled and firm fixed-
effects regressions (table 3 and 4). Thus, this finding confirms the hypothesis 1b that the overall 
level of product innovation increases over time after the emergence of a dominant design for a 
technological product. 
In hypothesis 2a, we proposed that the core subsystem, which became the dominant design 
accounts for less of an overall proportion of innovation immediately after the emergence of a 
dominant design. To test hypothesis 2a, similarly we examined the coefficient for the dominant 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Two years was deemed an appropriate amount of time to operationalize patent applications as a measure for the 
level of innovation based on the assumption that it takes roughly 11 months to file a patent application. So the first 
year would capture work in anticipation of the dominant design and the first and second years would capture work 
immediately following the dominant design. After two years it is more than two cycles of patenting out from the 
dominant design, which can no longer be considered “immediately following.” This is particularly relevant in fast-
changing industries such as digital electronics.  
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design variable for the proportion of catalyst subsystem for the first two years in model 3, table 3 
and 4. The catalyst subsystem is the ‘preceding’ core component. Contrary to our prediction, the 
coefficient is positive and this finding is consistent across the two different dataset (table 3 and 4). 
Thus, these findings indicate that the proportion of innovations associated with the preceding core 
component increased6 rather than decreased immediately after the emergence of a dominant 
design.  Consequently, there is no support for hypothesis 2a.  
In hypothesis 2b, we hypothesized that for a technological product, the proportion of 
innovation associated with the preceding core component (i.e. catalysts) declines over time during 
the era of incremental change. To test hypothesis 2b, we examined the coefficient for time trend 
variable in model 4, table 3 and 4. For the pooled regression (table 3), the coefficient is negative 
and significant (p <0.05). However, for the fixed-effects regression (table 4), the coefficient for 
the time trend variable is negative as expected but insignificant. Thus, we argue that hypothesis 
2b is weakly supported as there is partially significant support the hypothesis. 
In hypothesis 2c, we predicted that for a technological product, the proportion of 
innovation associated with a subsequent core component increase over time during the era of 
incremental change. To test hypothesis 2c, we examined the coefficient of the time trend variable 
for electronics subsystem in model 5 and 6 in both table 3 and 4. The electronics subsystem is the 
subsequent core component during the era of incremental innovation. As predicted, the time trend 
variable for electronics subsystem is positive and significant (p<0.05) for both model 5 and model 
6. Importantly, model 6 has patenting in auto electronics technology as a control and the time 
trend variable is still significant (p <0.05), indicating that this overall increase in emissions 
electronics is over and above the trend in automotive electronics in general. This finding is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Based on the positive and significant (p<0.001) regression coefficient for the dominant design dummy variable in 
model 4, table 3.  
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consistent in both the pooled and fixed-effects regressions. Consequently, there is significant 
support for hypothesis 2c. 
 In hypothesis 3a and 3b, we focus on changes in the innovating firm concentration for a 
technological product during the era of incremental innovation.  In hypothesis 3a, we proposed 
that the concentration of innovating firms is higher immediately following the emergence of a 
dominant design; and to test hypothesis 3a, we examined the coefficient for the dominant design 
dummy in model 7, table 3.  As expected, the regression coefficient is positive and significant 
(p<0.05), confirming the hypothesis 3a.  Moreover, the time trend variable in model 8 is negative 
and significant (p<0.1) confirming the hypothesis 3b, which predicted that the concentration of 
innovating firms in the industry decreases over time in the era of incremental change. 
 The regression coefficients for control variables, industry capital expenditures, automotive 
sales and total auto patents appear to be largely insignificant, suggesting that controls are only 
weakly related to overall product innovation or innovation in key subsystem technologies in the 
development of automotive emissions control technologies. Table 5 below is a summary of the 
models, hypotheses and findings, followed by a discussion of these results. 
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TABLE 5 
Summary of Findings 
 
Models and Hypotheses Findings 
Model 1 – Level of Product Innovation: Immediately Following Dominant Design 
H1a 
In a technological product industry, the overall level of product innovation 
immediately following the emergence of a dominant design will be lower than the 
level of product innovation before the emergence of a dominant design. 
Not Supported 
- Pooled: not supported  
- Fixed effects: not supported† 
 
Model 2 – Level of Product Innovation: Over Time 
H1b In a technological product industry, the overall level of product innovation increases over time during the era of incremental change. 
Supported 
- Pooled: supported  
- Fixed effects: supported 
Model 3 – Types of Component Innovation: Immediately Following Dominant Design  
H2a 
In a technological product industry, ‘preceding’ core components will account for 
less of an overall proportion (or share) of component innovations immediately 
following the emergence of a dominant design.  
Not Supported 
- Pooled: not supported †† 
- Fixed effects: not supported † 
Model 4– Types of Component Innovation: Over Time 
H2b 
In a technological product industry, ‘preceding’ core components will account for a 
decreasing proportion (or share) of component innovations over time during the era 
of incremental change. 
Weakly Supported 
- Pooled: supported  
- Fixed effects: not supported 
Models 5and6– Types of Component Innovation: Over Time 
H2c 
In a technological product, ‘subsequent’ core components will account for an 
increasing proportion (or share) of component innovations over time during the era 
of incremental change. 
Supported 
- Pooled: supported  
- Fixed effects: supported 
Model 7– Concentration of Innovating Firms: Immediately Following Dominant Design 
H3a 
In a technological product industry, the concentration of firms innovating 
immediately following the emergence of a dominant design will be higher than the 
concentration of firms innovating before the emergence of a dominant design. 
Supported  
Model 8– Concentration of Innovating Firms: Over Time 
H3b In a technological product industry, the concentration of innovating firms decreases over time during the era of incremental change. 
Supported  
 	   	  
† - Indicates that the coefficient was in the opposite direction (positive or negative) than hypothesized, but insignificant 
††- Indicates that the coefficient was in the opposite direction (positive or negative) than hypothesized and significant 
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6. Discussion 
Drawing on existing research into the “era of incremental change” in technological 
product lifecycles (Anderson and Tushman 1990), we develop and test hypotheses that imply a 
dynamic model of innovative activity in an industry in a period of time following the 
establishment of a dominant design. This model essentially breaks up this time period into two 
segments: (1) the period of time immediately following the establishment of the dominant design 
(H1a, H2a, H3a); and (2) over time until the next technological shift (H1b, H2b, H2c, and H2d). 
We apply this model to three different aspects of innovative activity: the level of overall product 
innovation; the relative types of component innovation; and the concentration of innovating firms 
in the industry. Findings are mixed for the automotive emission control industry in the period of 
time immediately following the standardization on the catalytic converter design, but they 
generally support hypotheses over time. Next we will discuss each of these three aspects of the 
innovative activity in the era of incremental change and the implications for research. 
 
Overall Level of Product Innovation 
We expected overall product innovation to pull back after a dominant design, as certain 
elements of the product design are stabilized and firms pursue other avenues for innovation – 
avenues that potentially provide more return, such as manufacturing processes (Klepper and 
Simon, 1997). However, we expected this reduced level of product innovation should increase 
over time. Our findings support the increase over time, but do not support the pull-back in the 
overall level of product innovation in the early years of the era of incremental change. Thus, 
overall innovation on technological products in the era of incremental change may not be less 
than during the era of ferment – which is often implied by many researchers who study 
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technology life cycles. Of course, one may argue that product innovations after a dominant design 
are smaller and more incremental – less radical than those before the dominant design. This is 
certainly the case to some extent – because architectures are stabilized so the innovative activity 
on an architectural level is diminished in favor of modular innovations (Henderson and Clark, 
1990). However, these modular, or within-component / subsystem innovations are not necessarily 
minor – and many of the manufacturing technologies and other areas of innovation may require 
complementary product improvements. For example, in his study of Rolls Royce’s aircraft engine 
manufacturing, Prencipe (1997) found that after the dominant design was established, there was 
intense investment in a variety of interrelated innovations for the next 15 years in materials, 
component designs, and manufacturing processes, which were all complementary. New alloys 
enabled the wide chord fan blade, for example, which required new manufacturing processes 
(Prencipe, 1997). Such interrelated, complementary product innovations only become more 
intense in situations that evolve the evolution of digital technologies such as digital controls. 
Digital control innovation brings with it a higher degree of interdependency with other 
components when compared to non-digital sorts of controls (such as hydraulic engine control 
systems, Brusoni et al., 2001). Further, digital technologies are programmable and generative 
(Yoo et al., 2010) which allows for interactions and complementarities across the entire product 
architecture outside of the modular interfaces between architectural components (Lee and 
Berente, 2012). These innovative elements of digital technologies can be important to innovation 
during the time frame of our study – it is precisely this time period where electronics innovations 
transformed the automotive industry (King and Lyytinen, 2005). We controlled for automotive 
electronics in our analysis (as well as a variety of other variables – including automotive 
innovation overall), and our results clearly appear to indicate that the stage in a technology’s life 
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cycle may not matter to overall innovation in quite the way others have thought in the past. These 
results are more in line with those studies that found the era of incremental change to be abundant 
with impactful innovation (Prencipe 1997; Murmann and Frenken 2006; Funk 2009; Lee et al 
2011; Dokko et al 2012). The question then became – what was the composition of this 
innovative period of time? We addressed this question by exploring the relative types of 
component innovation in automotive emissions. 
 
Types of Component Innovation 
The automotive emissions control industry provided a particularly valuable sample 
because there are fundamentally only two types of components: those associated with the catalyst, 
and those associated with digital controls. The catalyst was the sole core component before the 
emergence of the dominant design (what we describe as ‘preceding’ core component) – and 
during this time digital controls were peripheral. After the dominant design emerged, digital 
controls also became core to the innovative activity in automotive emissions. When a component 
goes from peripheral to core over time, we refer to this as a ‘subsequent’ core component (in 
relation to the ‘preceding’ core component). Thus our two sets of components enable us to isolate 
the relative patterns of movement associated with preceding and subsequent core components.  
Although the movement of innovative activity from certain core components to others has 
been characterized in the literature (Tushman and Rosenkopf 1993; Prencipe 2000; Murmann and 
Frenken 2006), there is no broad empirical analysis showing how this happens over the course of 
the era of incremental change. The literature indicates that after a dominant design the relative 
magnitude of innovative activity would focus on more diverse product components (Henderson 
and Clark 1990; Anderson and Tushman 1990), implying that the overall proportion of preceding 
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core component innovation would diminish immediately following the dominant design. Our 
findings do not support and actually contradict these expectations. The relative share of 
innovative activity on preceding core components does not diminish immediately after the 
dominant design – but does diminish (as a relative proportion of overall innovation) over time. 
This finding implies that core components may not necessarily become less important to 
innovative activity once a product architecture is stabilized because firms maintain knowledge 
across components even as overall product structures stabilize (Prencipe et al., 2003). However, 
although the proportion of innovation on preceding core components does not diminish 
immediately following the dominant design (quite the contrary – it increases!), it does account for 
relatively less of the overall product innovation over time, just as the subsequent core components 
account for more over time.	   This finding supports the idea that firms shift their innovative 
attention from previous to subsequent core components over time after the emergence of a 
dominant design. These findings are consistent with expectations that firms focus on more diverse 
components over time (Henderson and Clark, 1990; Anderson and Tushman, 1990) and that firms 
generally need to maintain competencies across a variety of components (Brusoni et al., 2001). Of 
course, this composition of innovating activities in an industry will have some relationship to the 
concentration of firms in that industry, which we will discuss next.  
 
Concentration of Innovating Firms 
In our findings, there was a higher concentration of innovating firms immediately 
following the emergence of a dominant design – a finding consistent with the idea of an industry 
“shake-out” where the winners in the innovation battle remain and the losers depart the industry 
(Klepper 1996; Utterback and Suarez 1993; Suarez 2003). Over time, however, due to the 
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stabilization and resulting certainty associated with the product architecture, this concentration 
diminishes as new entrants make increasing impacts on the product (Funk 2009). Two factors can 
explain this increase. First, dominant designs inevitably increase the degree of modularity of a 
technology product – even if that product is not entirely modular – and therefore one would 
expect the patterns of innovative activity following a dominant design to be consistent with the 
literature on modular innovations (Argyres and Bigelow, 2010). This finding is consistent with 
the work that identifies specific conditions when industry shakeout does not occur over time – 
these include situations that are quite consistent with the modularity argument, but do not focus 
on product architectures, and instead focus on industry effects such as “vertical separation” of 
appropriability (Bonaccorsi and Giuri 2001) and degree of partitioning in the network 
(Bonaccorsi and Giuri 2000). Second, in this case the subsequent core components involve digital 
technologies. Digital technologies require different capabilities for their design and development 
– including capabilities involving software programming – from the sorts of things incumbent 
firms have done in the past (Brusoni et al 2001; Yoo et al., 2012). Clearly many of these new 
capabilities will be provided by new entrants to previously non-digital industries such as the 
automotive industry in the 1980s. 	  
7. Conclusion 
The era of incremental change in a technological product’s life cycle may not be as 
‘uninteresting’ as it is often characterized in the literature. In this research, we take a step towards 
unpacking the patterns of innovative activity in this period of time that follows the emergence of a 
dominant design. Although in certain areas the era of incremental change behaves as expected – 
like with the initial shake-out of the industry and eventual decrease in concentration of innovators 
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following the dominant design – in other areas findings may be surprising. For example, the 
overall level of product innovation did not decrease after the dominant design – nor did the 
relative attention to core components. This is a step we take – along with a handful other recent 
studies (e.g., Funk, 2009; Dokko et al., 2012) in paying more attention to the era of incremental 
change.  	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